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WHAT IS RELIGIOUS 
PLURALISM?
ÉLISE ROUMÉAS
The aim of this chapter is to bring some conceptual 
clarity to the understanding of religious 
pluralism1. Such clarification appears necessary, 
given conflicting disciplinary usages and 
slippages between the factual notion of plurality 
and normative accounts of pluralism. Religious 
pluralism has at least four different meanings. The 
first meaning is theological: pluralism assumes 
that other religious paths are true. The second is 
sociological: pluralism simply means religious 
plurality or diversity. In the third, pluralism is 
a philosophical school, what is known as value-
pluralism in which values are irreducibly plural. 
Value-pluralism is not per se about religion, but 
can lead to a philosophical argument for valuing 
diversity intrinsically. Finally, a fourth conception 
of religious pluralism refers to a political ideal 
of peaceful interaction among individuals and 
groups of different religious faiths, as well as non-
believers. This paper sets out these four models.
1 I thank the editors of this volume for their useful contri-
bution to the final draft of this chapter.
THEOLOGICAL PLURALISM
The first meaning of religious pluralism is 
theological. In Christian thought, pluralistic 
theologies assume that other religions might 
be equally true2. Pluralism contrasts with two 
other related categories, namely exclusivism and 
inclusivism. Exclusivists believe that there is only 
one true faith and only one way to salvation. In 
its Catholic version, the idea is captured by the 
old Latin phrase “Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus”, 
i.e. “outside the Church there is no salvation.” 
Its Protestant counterpart emphasizes personal 
belief in Jesus Christ as the only path to salvation. 
Salvation, in this view, can only be attained 
through the Christian church or the Christian 
faith. 
Exclusivism has been challenged by inclusivism. 
Inclusivists also assume that there is one true 
religious faith and one path to salvation, but 
believe that non-Christians might be saved 
through the Christian path. The concept of 
“anonymous Christians” captures the idea that 
people who have never heard of Christ might still 
have an “implicit” faith in the real God. In this 
view, God probes all human hearts, Christian 
or otherwise, and learns who these anonymous 
2 I focus on the specific case of Christianity that has been 
much documented. Similar debates may have occurred 
in other religious traditions but remain less visible in the 
English-speaking literature. Much work remains to be 
done to shed light on the way different religious tradi-
tions relate to religious plurality. See John Hick, God Has 
Many Names (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982); 
John Hick and Brian Hebblethwaite, Christianity and 
Other Religions: Selected Readings (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1981); John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, The Myth of 
Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987); John 
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses 
to the Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989); Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name?: A Critical Survey 
of Christian Attitudes toward the World Religions (Mary-
knoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985); Raimundo Panikkar, 
The Intrareligious Dialogue (New York: Paulist Press, 
1978). 
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Christians are3. Devout Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, 
or even atheists, can therefore be saved through 
the Christian faith. 
Pluralism differs from both exclusivism and 
inclusivism insofar as it questions the “myth of 
uniqueness”4. There is no such thing as one true 
faith or a unique path to salvation. Pluralists do 
not assert that all religions have equal worth, but 
assume that other religious traditions could have 
a salvific potential. Interreligious dialogue is a way 
to learn more about the religious truths present in 
other religions.  
Pluralistic theologies developed in the Christian 
tradition especially between the 1970s and 1990s. 
There are different types of theological pluralism. 
Some pluralists argue that there is a fundamental 
unity among religious traditions. One of the most 
important defenders of such unitary pluralism, and 
perhaps the most controversial, is the philosopher 
of religion, John Hick. According to Hick, religions 
are different cognitive responses to the same 
Ultimate Reality. They are different phenomenal 
manifestations of the same noumenon5. Believers 
from different faiths can therefore engage together 
in truth-seeking dialogue. Since there is ultimately 
one religious truth, they can learn from each other’s 
imperfect religious knowledge. More cautiously, 
the theologian Raimundo Panikkar postulates the 
incommensurability of different religious paths6. 
There is no such thing as a common denominator 
shared by the world religions. But even without 
a common Ultimate Reality, dialogue is possible 
insofar as believers recognize the authenticity of 
the religious faith of others. What matters most is 
not the content of beliefs, but the sincerity of the 
3 This controversial idea of “anonymous Christians” was 
introduced by the German Jesuit theologian, Karl Rah-
ner (1904-1984). 
4 Hick and Knitter, The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: 
Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions. 
5 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to 
the Transcendent.
6 Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue.
faith. Interreligious dialogue becomes interfaith 
dialogue7.
Thus, the theological meaning of religious 
pluralism refers to a certain attitude towards 
religious plurality. It is a religious response to the 
fact of diversity that calls for an equal recognition 
of religious difference. Yet pluralistic theologies 
have been very controversial and received a fair 
amount of criticism within Christian circles8.
SOCIOLOGICAL “PLURALISM” OR 
PLURALITY
The second meaning of religious pluralism is 
sociological9. Pluralism refers here to the social 
phenomenon of religious plurality or diversity. 
This is an empirical fact, or rather a dynamic 
of pluralization, that deserves to be described 
and explained. To avoid any confusion, such 
sociological pluralism should be referred to as 
plurality. 
Religious plurality is not a new phenomenon10. In 
pre-reformation Europe, the Catholic Church was 
already dealing with “infidels” (Jews and Muslims), 
and the Orthodox Church of Eastern Europe. 
7 Interfaith dialogue often includes non-religious beliefs, 
such as agnostic or atheist views. Such opinions are 
interpreted as specific kinds of faith.
8 See Gavin D’Costa, Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: 
The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions (Maryk-
noll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990).
9 Sociological pluralism (or “plurality”) refers here to 
a descriptive account of diversity. This does not imply 
that all sociologists use the notion in a purely descrip-
tive fashion. James Beckford, for example, is critical of 
the conflation between descriptive and normative usages 
of “pluralism” in sociology. As a matter of “conceptual 
hygiene”, he writes, “it is preferable to associate ‘plu-
ralism’ with ideological and normative positions”. See 
James A. Beckford, Social Theory and Religion (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 79.
10 Benjamin J. Kaplan, Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict 
and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2007).
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In a context of superposition between religious 
and political entities, “heresy” was perceived as a 
crime against the political body, and the struggle 
against heretics was fierce. One group of dissidents 
succeeded in establishing themselves, namely the 
Hussites of Bohemia, in the fifteenth century. The 
subsequent reformations of the sixteenth century 
brought about unforeseen religious divisions – not 
only, that is, between Catholics and Protestants 
but also within Protestantism itself. Protestantism 
was soon divided into rival congregations, such 
as Lutherans, Reformed (or “Calvinists”), and 
Anabaptists. This new diversity shows how 
religious disagreements and cleavages frequently 
cut across religious traditions. 
The sociological phenomenon of religious 
pluralism has acquired new scope in recent 
decades, both in Western Europe and the United 
States11. This religious diversity encompasses 
not only Christians, Jews, and Muslims, but 
also non-Abrahamic religions, such as Hindus, 
Buddhists, new religious movements and, of 
course, a growing number of non-believers12. 
Globalization and migration play a significant 
role in the pluralization of Western societies. 
Through these processes, modernity has not led 
to the disappearance of religion, as some theories 
of secularization predicted, but to a deep plurality. 
Not only do various religions coexist but religion 
itself undergoes a process of internal pluralization. 
French sociologist Danièle Hervieu-Léger speaks 
of “exploded religion” (religion éclatée) in order to 
describe this contemporary religious landscape13. 
In it, religion becomes increasingly subjectivized 
and individual believers tend to come up with their 
11 Thomas F. Banchoff, Democracy and the New Religious 
Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
12 The question of the inclusion of non-believers within the 
concept of religious plurality is an interesting one. Here 
I include also non-religious beliefs (such as atheism and 
agnosticism). Even if they are arguably not religious per 
se, they define themselves in relation to religion. 
13 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Le Pélerin et le converti: la reli-
gion en mouvement. (Paris: Flammarion, 1999): 29.
own bricolage — they pick and choose what they 
find appealing in different religions14. This process 
of customization of religion reflects what Peter 
Berger calls the “heretical imperative”, namely the 
prominent place of “choice” in modern beliefs15. 
In these ways, many sociologists argue that 
modernity and pluralization go hand in hand. As 
Charles Taylor puts it: 
the present scene, shorn of the 
earlier forms, is different and 
unrecognizable to any earlier 
epoch. It is marked by an unheard 
of pluralism of outlooks, religious 
and non- and anti-religious, in 
which the number of possible 
positions seems to be increasing 
without end16.
The question of religious plurality becomes more 
complex when one considers not only the diversity 
of religious traditions, but also the variety of 
religious movements within and outside these 
traditions, as well the diversity of unbeliefs. Some 
religions are monotheist, others polytheist, and 
some are Godless. There is even some doubt 
about the relevance of the concept of religion 
to encompass all these phenomena17. Religious 
plurality is not only about the one and the many, 
it is a multifaceted diversity that requires constant 
interpretation.
14 Ibid., 18.
15 Hairesis in Greek means choice. See Peter L. Berger, 
The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of 
Religious Affirmation (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 
1979).
16 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007): 437.
17 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Reli-
gion (Minneapolis, Minn: Fortress Press, 1991). See 
chapter 2: “‘Religion’ in the West”.
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PHILOSOPHICAL PLURALISM
The third meaning of pluralism is philosophical. In 
liberal political theory, diversity can be envisaged 
either as a fact or as an instrumental value18. On 
the one hand, the liberal state must ensure that 
diversity does not threaten the stability of the 
system. When John Rawls speaks about “the fact 
of pluralism”, he is referring to the sociological 
phenomenon19. He could be speaking about 
plurality instead. However, he gives a specific 
interpretation of pluralism, through the idea of 
reasonable pluralism. Reasonable pluralism refers 
to the irreducible diversity of religious, moral, 
and philosophical comprehensive doctrines, both 
incompatible and reasonable20. Diversity (including 
religious diversity) is envisaged as a natural 
consequence of the exercise of autonomous reason 
18 William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implica-
tions of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 
27. Galston associates the first with John Rawls and the 
second with John Stuart Mill and James Madison.
19 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005).
20 Rawls does not define reasonableness as such, but he 
does specify some aspects of a “reasonable person” (Ibid., 
48-63). One aspect is the willingness of individuals to 
propose and abide by principles and standards as fair 
terms of cooperation, to the extent that others recipro-
cate. Another aspect is the readiness of individuals to 
recognize and accept the consequences of the burdens 
of judgment. Burdens of judgment are the reasons why 
reasonable and sincere persons disagree on moral, reli-
gious, or philosophical issues (Rawls, Political liberal-
ism, 56-57): (1) Evidence is conflicting and complex and 
therefore hard to assess and evaluate; (2) We disagree 
about the weight that should be given to the same con-
siderations; (3) Conceptual indeterminacy forces us to 
rely on differing judgments and interpretations; (4) Our 
assessment of evidence depends upon our life experience 
(position in society, ethnicity, etc.); (5) There are differ-
ent normative considerations to both sides of an issue; 
(6) Some selection of values must be made since a system 
of social institution is limited in the values it can admit. 
Because of the burdens of judgment, the careful use of 
reason does not lead to the same conclusions. Reason-
able persons hold different comprehensive doctrines and 
pluralism prevails.
in a democratic regime. For Rawls, autonomy and 
diversity are compatible and complementary. The 
valorization of autonomy by liberalism provides 
the conditions for diversity to thrive. On the 
other hand, diversity is instrumentally valued by 
some liberals because it benefits individuals and 
society. John Stuart Mill, for example, argues that 
the diversity of opinions and beliefs serves the 
quest for truth. In addition, the variety of ways of 
life is linked to the development of individuality 
which is crucial to social progress. We have good 
instrumental reasons, according to Mill, to value 
diversity21.
There is, however, a third way between a 
factual account and an instrumental defense of 
diversity. Philosophical pluralism values diversity 
intrinsically. Pluralism here is a theory of value 
— value-pluralism — whose metaphysical 
assumptions are contested. This kind of pluralism 
contrasts with monism, the idea that values can 
be harmonized in a unified system or reduced 
to a common denominator. According to Isaiah 
Berlin, pluralism is: 
the conception that there are many 
different ends that men may seek 
and still be fully rational, fully men, 
capable of understanding each other 
and sympathizing and deriving 
lights from each other, as we derive 
from reading Plato or the novels of 
medieval Japan — worlds, outlooks, 
very remote from our own22.
In this view, pluralism differs from a vulgar 
relativism (or subjectivism) which would say: 
“I prefer coffee, you prefer champagne. We 
have different tastes. There is no more to be 
21 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991). See “On Liberty”, chap-
ter 3: “Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-
being”.
22 Isaiah Berlin and Henry Hardy, The Crooked Timber 
of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (London: 
Murray, 1990): 11.
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said”23. Contrary to relativism thus construed, 
pluralism asserts that values are objective, and 
that humans pursue them as ends in themselves. 
Such values can be in conflict, which means 
that they are incompatible with each other and 
incommensurable. As a result, “[we] are doomed to 
choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable 
loss”24. The choice between incompatible values 
implies a moral cost. 
For Joseph Raz, autonomy is intimately linked 
to pluralism25. Autonomy indeed requires the 
possibility to choose between a diversity of 
worthwhile choices. William Galston, on the 
other hand, argues that liberalism should not be 
centrally concerned with autonomy, but rather 
with “the protection of legitimate diversity”26. 
A diverse society is one where individuals can 
choose freely among a plurality of conceptions 
of the good life. Diversity provides the necessary 
conditions for the exercise of autonomy, but also 
for “expressive liberty” which allows individuals 
and groups to lead their lives in conformity with 
their convictions, although these convictions do 
not always reflect the value of autonomy 27.
Value-pluralism concerns first of all goods, and 
not ways of life, cultures, or religions28. However, 
the metaphysical premise of an irreducible 
plurality of value can easily be translated into a 
principle of “respect for plurality” insofar as it 
reflects the plurality of goods29. George Crowder 
adds that pluralism should not only value the 
diversity of cultures, but diversity within cultures, 
insofar as it favors autonomy. If value-pluralism is 
23 Ibid., 11.
24 Ibid., 16.
25 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford [Oxford-
shire]: Clarendon Press, 1986).
26 Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value 
Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice, 23.
27  Ibid., 28.
28 George Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism”, 
Political Theory 35 (2007): 133.
29 Ibid.,132
not properly speaking about religion, it can justify 
a normative position in favor of the valorization of 
diversity, including religious diversity30.
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AS A 
POLITICAL IDEAL
In its fourth sense, pluralism does not take a 
theological stance about religious truth, nor does 
it make a metaphysical claim about the nature of 
value. Pluralism is also not to be confused with 
mere plurality or diversity. Rather, it refers to a 
political ideal of peaceful interaction of individuals 
and groups of different religious traditions and 
confessions, as well as non-believers. Pluralism 
portrays a world that has moved “beyond mere 
toleration” toward the active engagement with 
religious difference. 
How does pluralism relate to toleration? Toleration 
can be understood in many different ways31. Let 
us define it quite narrowly as an attitude of self-
restraint when confronted with beliefs or behaviors 
judged to be reprehensible. To be tolerant is to 
refrain from acting to eradicate what is perceived 
as wrong. Toleration presupposes some kind of 
moral judgment, but accepts a resignation in the 
face of evil. This kind of toleration leads, at best, to 
peaceful coexistence. By contrast, the pluralistic 
attitude points to recognition and promotes the 
enthusiastic endorsement of difference. Difference 
should not be deplored, but celebrated as a facet of 
the inherent diversity of a free society. 
30 See Michael Jinkins, Christianity, Tolerance, and Plural-
ism: A Theological Engagement with Isaiah Berlin’s Social 
Theory (London: Routledge, 2004).
31 According to Michael Walzer, several attitudes can be 
encompassed under the umbrella of toleration, ranging 
from mere resignation to enthusiasm. I believe that the 
enthusiastic endorsement of differences should no longer 
be labeled toleration, but rather a pluralistic attitude. See 
Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1997): 10-11. 
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Here, pluralism goes beyond toleration — that 
leads to mere coexistence — to refer to active 
engagement across boundaries of faith — 
interfaith cooperation. 
This understanding of religious pluralism is 
consistent with the definition of Courtney Bender 
and Pamela Klassen, namely as “a commitment to 
recognize and understand others across perceived 
or claimed lines of religious differences”32. It 
is also very close to Thomas Banchoff et al.’s 
definition in which religious pluralism refers to 
“patterns of peaceful interaction among diverse 
religious actors — individuals and groups 
who identify with, and act out of, particular 
religious traditions”33. Why speak of “peaceful” 
interaction? Because, says Banchoff, the ideal of 
religious pluralism “ends where violence begins”34. 
Such conceptions of religious pluralism do not 
contradict the fact that religious plurality pertains 
to differences, disagreements, and conflicting 
interests. Pluralism does not deny the existence 
of strong controversies within religions, between 
religions, and between religions and the secular; 
instead, pluralism poses an ideal of the regulation 
of conflicts through peaceful interaction.
32 Courtney Bender and Pamela E. Klassen, After Plural-
ism: Reimagining Religious Engagement (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010): 2.
33 Thomas F. Banchoff, Religious Pluralism, Globalization, 
and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008): 4.
34 Ibid., 5.
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